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Many bacteria secrete compounds which act as public goods. Such compounds are
often under quorum sensing (QS) regulation, yet it is not understood exactly when
bacteria may gain from having a public good under QS regulation. Here, we show that the
optimal public good production rate per cell as a function of population size (the optimal
production curve, OPC) depends crucially on the cost and benefit functions of the public
good and that the OPC will fall into one of two categories: Either it is continuous or it
jumps from zero discontinuously at a critical population size. If, e.g., the public good has
accelerating returns and linear cost, then the OPC is discontinuous and the best strategy
thus to ramp up production sharply at a precise population size. By using the example
of public goods with accelerating and diminishing returns (and linear cost) we are able to
determine how the two different categories of OPSs can best be matched by production
regulated through a QS signal feeding back on its own production. We find that the
optimal QS parameters are different for the two categories and specifically that public
goods which provide accelerating returns, call for stronger positive signal feedback.
Keywords: quorum sensing, cooperation, cost and benefit functions, bacteria, public good production and
regulation
1. Introduction
Bacterial cells live complex lives, constantly adjusting to the fluctuating presence or absence
of nutrients, toxins, competitors and other environmental factors. They do this by regulating
the production of different molecules that can perform the functions required to give them a
fitness advantage in the current environment. Some of these molecules, like membrane bound
nutrient receptors, are “private goods” which provide a benefit only to the individual cell
that produced them. Others are molecules that are secreted by the cells and perform their
function outside. Once secreted these molecules can diffuse away and potentially benefit other
cells making them “public goods.” Microbes which produce extracellular molecules that can
be thought of as public goods are ubiquitous. Examples of such products are: extracellular
enzymes (Pirhonen et al., 1993), exopolysaccharides (used in biofilms) (Weiner et al., 1995;
Vu et al., 2009), surfactants (aiding motility) (Kearns, 2010; Xavier et al., 2011), antimicrobial
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(for fighting other microbes) (Mazzola et al., 1992; Moons
et al., 2005, 2006; An et al., 2006), virulence factors (for
fighting a host organism’s immune system, or for exploitation
of host resources) (Zhu et al., 2002; Sandoz et al., 2007;
Köhler et al., 2009), siderophores (for scavenging iron from the
environment) (Neilands, 1984; Harrison and Buckling, 2009;
Kümmerli and Brown, 2010). Although such cooperation in
bacteria has received a lot of attention (Hense and Schuster,
2015), exactly how benefit and cost depends on the extracellular
concentration of public good and the production rate of common
goods (hereafter referred to as the benefit/cost function of
the public good) has in general not been studied in great
detail experimentally. Results from a recent theoretical paper
(Cornforth et al., 2012), however shows that non-linearity in
the benefit and cost curves is expected to radically impact the
evolutionary dynamics of a cooperating population and that the
shape of the benefit function will influence whether a population
may benefit from having a public good under quorum sensing1
(QS) regulation. Bacterial public goods are in fact often under
QS regulation. For example in P. aeruginosa secreted compounds
are significantly overrepresented in the list of quorum sensing
regulated gene products (Schuster and Greenberg, 2006). It
is often assumed that public goods provide more benefit at
higher population densities (e.g., Waters and Bassler, 2005;
Diggle et al., 2007) and this has also recently been shown to be
true experimentally for a specific public good produced by P.
aeruginosa (Darch et al., 2012). There is however still a lack of
general analytical arguments concerning exactly when and why a
bacterial populationmay benefit fromhaving a public good under
QS regulation.
Here we use simple mathematical models, to find out how the
shape of the cost and benefit function of a public good determines
the optimal way to regulate the production of the public good.
To illustrate our general point we have determined how the
optimal public good production rate depends on the population
size, for public goods with either accelerating or diminishing
returns when cost is linear. Further we have determined how
well a QS system can generate production curves that mimic
the analytically determined optimal curves, and we discuss
whether there might be evolutionary trade-offs associated with
the optimal QS parameters for regulating certain public goods.
2. Models and Results
2.1. Optimal Production of Public Goods in a
Well-mixed Population
We consider a well-mixed2 population of isogenic cells that
produce a public good, E. Let 1g denote the change in growth
1Quorum sensing (QS) is a bacterial behavior ubiquitously present in themicrobial
world and most bacteria possess at least one quorum-sensing system, (Fuqua et al.,
2001; Miller and Bassler, 2001; Schauder and Bassler, 2001). This term covers all
types of behavior where bacteria produce, secrete, and subsequently respond to
diffusable signal molecules. Typically, the signal molecules are small and relatively
cheap to produce, e.g., an acyl homoserine lactone (Fuqua et al., 2001).
2Using a well-mixed system is a simplification that allows us to treat each cell
as identical to all others and to ignore spatial variations in the public good
concentration.
rate of such a population due to the act of producing the
public good. 1g, which could be negative or positive, can be
decomposed into the benefits accrued from having the public
good present and the costs of producing it. We make the
following assumptions about the cost and benefit functions:
(1) The cost is an increasing function of the rate of production
of the public good.
(2) The cost is zero when no public good is being produced.
(3) The benefit is an increasing function of the concentration of
the public good.
(4) The benefit does not increase indefinitely as the
concentration of the public good increases; it saturates
at some finite value.
(5) The benefit is zero when there is no public good present.
For now, we will assume that the cost is a linear function3 of
the rate of production, σE, of the public good, and the benefit a
sigmoidal function of the concentration, E, of public good:
1g = benefit − cost
= β1
(E/KE)
h
1+ (E/KE)h
+ β2
(E/KE)
1+ (E/KE)
− κσE (1)
KE is the concentration of of public good where the benefit is half
of the maximum value, β1 + β2 is the maximum benefit possible
and κ is the proportionality constant which quantifies how
common good production translate to growth rate reduction.
We will for now focus in particular on the shape of the first
two terms of Equation (1), i.e., the benefit function of the
public good, (see Figures 1A,B). The exponent h allows us to
modulate the shape of the benefit function. When h ≤ 1,
the benefit function is always concave, i.e., its slope is highest
at E = 0 and steadily decreases as E increases. In other
words, increasing public goods results in diminishing returns.
In contrast, when h > 1, increasing public goods initially
results in accelerating returns; i.e., the benefit function is initially
convex. In Figure 2 we propose a concrete example of a class of
public goods that can have differently shaped benefit functions
depending on the precise molecular mechanism by which the
public good works. Proteases that work by degrading proteins
in the environment into smaller metabolizable pieces can work
in two different ways: Exoproteases break the polymer peptide
bonds starting from the end of the polymer and endoproteases
target specific peptide bonds effectively breaking the polymers
at random. These two modes of action can cause the benefit
function to be either initially convex (endo) or concave (exo)
(providing accelerating or diminishing returns, respectively. See
supplement for the full length derivation which leads to this
conclusion).
We nowwish to determine how the convexity/concavity of the
benefit function influences the optimal production strategy for a
public good when the cost function is linear. The rate of change
of the concentration of a public good E in a well-mixed system
with N cells wil be given by:
3More on general nonlinear cost and benefit functions in the discussion.
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A B
FIGURE 1 | Concave/convex benefit function. (A) The benefit is here
a sigmoidal function: b(x) = β1
(x/KE )
h
1+(x/KE )
h
+ β2
(x/KE )
1+(x/KE )
, plotted for two
different values of the exponent h = [1,2], with x = E. The parameter h
can be manipulated so that benefit initially decelerates (h = 1, concave,
light green) or accelerates (h > 1, convex, dark green) with increasing
concentration of public good. The remaining parameters are β1 = 0.7,
β2 = 0.3, KE = 25. (B) When the timescale of public good production
and degradation are much faster than the timescale for growth of cells,
public good concentration is proportional with production rate and
population size, E ∝ σEN. Dark green, the convex benefit curve
BN (σE ) = b(NσE ) is shown as a function of the common good
production rate per cell σE for N = [1,10,25,49,100,200]. Red, linear
cost curve c(σE ) = κσE , κ = 1.
dE
dt
= NσE − EγE, (2)
where σE is the public good production rate per cell and γE is the
degradation rate of the public good. For the sake of simplicity
we will for now make the assumption that the timescales of
public good production and degradation are much faster than
the timescale for growth of cells. This allows us to assume that
the public good concentration is always at steady state value E∗
for a given population size:
E∗ = N
σE
γE
, (3)
and thus we can express E∗ as a function of σE When this
assumption holds we can, by replacing E in Equation (1) with
E∗ from Equation (3) write the effect of the public good on
the growth rate 1g(σE,N) in terms of population size N and
production rate per cell σE only. In this situation, it is evident that
cells which produce public good at a rate, σ
opt
E that maximizes
Equation (1), for each value of N, will grow fastest. In Figure 3
we have plotted this optimal rate σ
opt
E (N) as a function of N.
We see that the function σ
opt
E (N) has very different properties
when the benefit function is always concave (e.g., h = 1),
compared to when it is initially convex (h > 1), even though
the curves in Figure 1 appear quite similar at first glance. When
h = 1, σ
opt
E (N) rises smoothly from zero at Ncrit to a maximum
and then decreases smoothly to zero as N → ∞. In contrast,
when h > 1, i.e., with accelerating returns, σ
opt
E (N) = 0 for
low values of N, jumps discontinuously to a non-zero value at
Ncrit . After the jump the production rate may rise further to a
maximum before decreasing to zero, or may simply decrease to
zero, as N → ∞, depending on the values of other parameters
such as h, β1, β2, c. For both a concave and a convex benefit
curve (when cost is linear) the optimal behavior can be only to
turn on common good production when a critical population
size, Ncrit > 1 has been reached
4. The take home message is
that the difference between the concave and the convex benefit
curve cases is that in the convex case the optimal production
curve will be discontinuous at the critical population size
Ncrit
5.
2.2. Regulating public goods using a quorum
sensing system
In the previous paragraph we saw that the convexity/concavity
of the public good benefit function is important for determining
the shape of the optimal public good production curve, i.e., the
way the optimal production rate depends on population size.
Although the curves are very different it is clear that for both
h = 1 and h > 1 the optimal production rate varies with
the population size, (see Figures 3A,B) and that in both cases
it thus looks like cells would benefit from having production
linked to a mechanism which senses the cell density; a property
which QS systems possess. We now wish to determine just how
closely a QS regulation mechanism realistically could come to
generating production curves matching the optimal curves in
Figures 3A,B.
4If Ncrit < 1 even a single cell will obviously benefit from production no matter
what the benefit curve is shaped like
5See Supplementary Materials for a further discussion on (1) the case of a
spatially structured system, (2) situations where the assumption that timescales of
production and decay of public good are much faster than the time scale of growth
does not hold.
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A1 A2
B1 B2
FIGURE 2 | Example of public goods with differently shaped benefit
functions. Proteases which works extracellularly by degrading polymers that
are too large to be transported over the cell membrane can either break the
peptide bonds of the polymer starting from the end of the polymer
(exoprotease) or target a range of specific types of peptide bond within the
chain, effectively breaking bonds at random (endoprotease). In this scenario
benefit is proportional to the probability of yielding “edible” pieces of polymer.
(A1,A2) Benefit increases approximately linearly with exoprotease
concentration resulting in an initially concave benefit function. (B1,B2) The
probability of breaking the polymer at a site producing an piece small enough
to transport over the cell membrane is low when enzyme concentration is low,
but accelerates as endoprotease concentration increases, resulting in a initially
convex benefit function.
2.2.1. A Simple Well-mixed Model of QS Regulated
Public Good Production
We formulate a simple ODE model of a well mixed population
producing signal and public good with a positive feedback of
signal on its own production:
dS
dt
= N
(
1+ σmaxS
(S/KS)
α
1+ (S/KS)α
)
− S (4)
dE
dt
= NσmaxE
(S/KS)
α
1+ (S/KS)α
− γEE (5)
Here S is the concentration of quorum sensing signal molecule6,
E, the concentration of public good and N is the number of
cells. The equations are non-dimensionalized by measuring all
rates in units of the basal rate of signal production (i.e., the
rate of signal production when signal concentration is very
low) and by measuring time in units of the mean lifetime
of a signal molecule 1/γS. The rate of signal production
when the population is fully induced is σmaxS + 1 and
7 σmaxE
is the maximum rate of public good production per cell.
The mean lifetime of a public good molecule is 1/γE and
KS is the signal concentration where both signal production
and public good production is at half of the maximum
rate. The exponent α captures the strength of the positive
feedback of the signal on its own production; for example
this could be the cooperativity of the DNA binding by
the transcription factor which activates production of signal
synthase. In this model, signal receptor molecules are not
modeled explicitly for the sake of simplicity. The parameter,
α, does thus strictly not need to be interpreted just as the
cooperativity of the transcription factor DNA binding but could
also be influenced by the effect of signal positively feeding
back on production of receptor molecules, (as discussed in
Haseltine and Arnold, 2008; Rai et al., 2012). Assuming that
both signal and public good have the same half-saturation
constant KS and feedback exponent α is probably a crude
assumption which we will nonetheless make for the sake of
simplicity.
Once again we make the assumption that production and
decay of quorum sensing molecules and public good molecules
happen at a much faster timescale than growth of cells. This
means that we can assume that for each population size N, signal
concentration, S, will reach steady state, S∗. In Figure 4 the steady
state concentration of QS signal S∗ is plotted as function of the
population size N for different values of the feedback exponent
α. We see that when α goes above a certain critical value αC
(see supplement for an analytical expression for αC) the system
will have a bistable region with two stable equilibria, S∗
low
and
S∗
high
(and one unstable, S∗
unstable
in between). Such bistability has
indeed been observed in Vibrio fischeri: In Williams et al. (2008)
they show that the regulation of expression of luxI during the
Vibrio fischeriQS response exhibits hysteretic dependency on QS
signal molecule (auto inducer) concentration [AI], due to AI-
dependent autoregulation of luxR expression. They find that the
“memory” of QS induction is maintained in the population due
to a high level of LuxR, and thus a relatively high level of LuxR–AI
complexes, even when [AI] is gradually decreased.
6Actually the feedback acts not on the signal production but on the production
of the signal synthase, an enzyme which facilitates the production of signal
intracellularly, but since concentration of signal synthase and signal has been found
to be approximately proportional (e.g., in the Las system of P. aeruginosa Duan
and Surette, 2007), we can model concentration of signal and signal synthase by
one symbol S.
7Note that because all rates are given in units of the basal signal production rate
(σ basalS ≡ 1), σ
max
S is in fact the ratio between the basal rate and the maximum rate.
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FIGURE 3 | Concave/convex benefit curves result in
continuous/discontinuous optimal production curves respectively.
(A,B) Green curves show optimal production rate of public good, σ
opt
E
as a
function of population size, N for the concave/convex benefit functions
shown in figure 1. The optimal value, σ
opt
E
(N), corresponds to the σE which
maximizes 1g for N. The magnitude of 1g in the (N, σE )-space is shown by
the colorbar. (A) In the case h = 1 the optimal production function is
continuous and can be put in closed form: σ
opt
E,h=1 (N) =
max(
√
(βKEγE )/(cN)− (KEγE )/N, 0), where β = β1 + β2. The critical
population size above which public good production is nonzero, when h = 1
is: Ncrit =
c
β
γEKE . (B) When the benefit curve is convex, h = 2, the optimal
production function is discontinuous. (C,D): Light/dark green curves show
the effect on growth rate 1g for a population producing common good at
exactly the optimal rate when the benefit curve is concave/convex
respectively. Black dashed curves show the effect on growth rate 1g for a
population producing common good at a constant rate
σconst
E
= 1/(Nmax − Ncrit )6
Nmax
Ncrit
σ
opt
E
(N), equal to the average of the
non-zero part of the optimal curve, (shown as black dashed lines in (A,B). (E)
The cumulative fitness, w ≡ (
∫ Nmax
1 1g(N)dN)/wmax , where
wmax ≡
∫ Nmax
1 1g
opt (N)dN, (def. in Equation 7) of different constant
production strategies for a common good with concave (light green) and
convex (dark green) benefit functions respectively. Note that in the case of
the “concave common good” there is a range of different constant
production rates which allows the population to perform better than a
nonproducing population w > 0, however for the “convex common good”
any constant production strategy will leed to worse fitness than that of a
nonproducing population, w < 0 for all σconst
E
> 0. (In this figure σE is given
in units of κ/γE , which was set to one).
The public good production rate per cell, σE, for a given
population sizeN will be given by the first right hand side term in
Equation (5) and thus depend on the steady state concentration
of signal, S∗(N):
σE(N) ≡ σ
max
E
(S∗/KS)
α
1+ (S∗/KS)α
. (6)
When the system is in the bistable regime this means that
there will be two different production curves; one which
involves the lower stable equilibria (S∗
low
) that the system
will follow when going from low to high cell numbers
and another curve which involves the the higher stable
equilibria (S∗
high
) which the system will follow when going from
high cell numbers to low. Figures 5A–C (left panels) show
examples of such QS production curves (with and without
bistability) plotted together with the corresponding optimal
curves.
2.3. Quantifying the Fitness of a Public Good
Regulation Strategy
Different choices of QS parameters α, KS and σ
max
E result in
different public good production curves, σE(N) and these curves,
may resemble the optimal curves from Figures 3A,B more or
less. In order to determine which QS parameters optimize the
regulation of a public good with a specific benefit function
we need a way to assess the fitness of a population of cells
which utilize a specific “production curve” or in other words
a specific “common good regulation strategy.” Equation (1)
expresses how the impact of production on growth rate, 1g,
depend on the production rate, σE. For a given QS regulated
production curve σE(N), Equation (1) gives a corresponding
function 1g(N, h) ≤ 1gopt(N, h) which shows how growth is
affected by public good production as population size, N, varies.
In the right panels of Figures 5A–C, the corresponding1g(N, h)
curve of the production curve σE(N) from the left panel is plotted.
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FIGURE 4 | Increasing the QS signal feedback exponent α causes
hysteretic response to population changes. Steady state QS signal
concentration, S* as function of the population size N, plotted for four different
values of the QS feedback exponent α = [1.0,1.2,1.5,2.0]. When
α > αc =
2+σmaxs +2
√
1+σmaxs
σmaxs
≈ 1.2210 the system will be bistable for a
certain range of population sizes. (σmax
S
= 100, concentration of S is here
given in units of σbasal
S
/γS. σ
basal
S
is the basal production rate and γS is the
degradation/depletion rate of the of signal, which is here set to 1.)
The cumulative fitness/performance of a given production
curve/production strategy, σE(N), can be quantified by the
following expression:
w ≡
∫ Nmax
1 1g(N)dN∫ Nmax
1 1g
opt(N)dN
. (7)
This fitness measure quantifies how growth is affected by public
good production over a range of different population sizes (the
range set by the limits8 of the integral, [1,Nmax]). The cumulative
fitness, w, is normalized with respect to the performance of a
population which follows the optimal production strategy. This
means that fitness will be one (w = 1) if the QS production curve
perfectly mimics the optimal curve σ
opt
E (N, h) and fitness will be
zero (w = 0) for a population which does not produce public
good at all, (negative fitness corresponds to having a lower fitness
than a non-producing population).
8For this study we examine the behavior of the system in the vicinity of the critical
turn on point, Ncrit and not in the limit of high N. As a population approaches
stationary state or starvation additional layers of gene regulation will become
relevant and cause down regulation of genes which have been activated by QS,
(Navarro Llorens et al., 2010; Gopalkrishnan et al., 2014). This type of regulation
was not included in our simple QS model which is the reason that we choose to
evaluate the QS production curves as a function of population size only on in the
range [1;Nmax] where Nmax is not much larger than the critical population size
Ncrit above which cooperation become beneficial.
2.3.1. “Turn on” and “Turn off” of Public Good
Production in the Wild
It has been observed in several experimental studies (e.g., Sandoz
et al., 2007) that, often non-producing cheater mutants will arise
over time in populations which secrete a public good. Invasion
of a faster growing cheater mutant could fragment the producer
population and thus lead to an effective dilution of the wild
type population. It seems that in this type of situation, having
a mechanism which would down regulate production of public
good in response to the decreasing producer cell density would be
crucial for the wild type cells’ ability to avoid population collapse
(this scenario is also discussed in Melke et al., 2010). It thus
seems there could exists ecological settings where both “turn on”
and “turn off” scenarios are important for the fitness of the QS
strategy.
Very little is known about actual ecological situations in
the wild where bacteria use quorum sensing to regulate gene
expression. In most of the quorum sensing literature the
emphasis has been on the process of turning on QS regulated
genes when population size increases, not off when it decreases.
This bias might stem from the fact that “turn off” scenarios are
probably not of great importance in the organism where QS was
first discovered, Vibrio fischeri. This bacterium lives in symbiosis
with the bobtailed squid (McFall-Ngai and Ruby, 2000; Visick
et al., 2000; McFall-Ngai et al., 2012), an ecological setting where
the bacteria periodically go through stages of population increase
and decrease. The bacteria slowly grow to high density inside
the light organ of the squid, reach the point where they turn on
light production at nightfall only to be quickly diluted and turn
off light production when the squid spurts out the majority of
the bacteria by morning. In this situation, the dilution of signal
and decrease in the population density happen so fast when the
squid vents its light organ, that there is probably no need to have
an accurate mechanism for down regulating light production as
the population density decreases since very little time is spent at
intermediate densities.
2.3.2. Quantifying Fitness in both “Turn On” and “Turn
Off” Scenarios
As we saw earlier, there exist parameters for which the QS
signaling system is bistable and thus where a set of QS
parameters, (α,KS, σ
max
E ), correspond to not one production
curve but to two: one “turn on” curve which the population will
follow when going from low to high numbers and one “turn off”
curve which it will follow when going from high to low numbers.
For a bacteria population that encounters both situations where
they need to regulate public good expression as the population is
increasing andwhen it is decreasing andwhich has such a bistable
set of parameters, we thus need to assess the performance in both
situations and include both in the fitness measure. One way of
doing this is simply by using a weighted average of the cumulative
fitness, w, of the two individual production curves:
w ≡ θonwon + θoffwoff (8)
[where the weights add up to one (θon + θoff = 1)]. Depending
on how often a population encounters “turn on” and “turn off”
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Turn o! Turn on
Turn o! Turn on
Turn o!
Turn o! Turn on
Turn on
QS parameters optimized for regulation of
a ‘concave’ common good.
(Turn on and turn o! curves are identical). 
QS parameters optimized for regulation of 
a ‘convex’ common good, when only ‘turn on’ 
scenarios matter.
QS parameters optimized for regulation of
 a ‘convex’ common good, when both ‘turn on’  
and ‘turn o! ’scenarios matter.
FIGURE 5 | Quorum sensing parameters optimized for different
ecological scenarios and different types of public goods. (A–C)
Left side panels: Green curves shows optimal production rate, σ
opt
E
, as a
function of population size N. Black full line and dashed line show the
production rate as a function of population size, N, when production is
regulated by (A): a QS system with parameters such that cumulative
fitness, w is optimized for a public good with the concave benefit
function shown in Figure 1 (α = 1.1, KS = 2200, σ
max
E
= 0.33), (B): a
system with QS parameters for a public good with a convex benefit
function maximizing cumulative fitness w in only “turn on” scenarios,
(α = 2, KS = 980, and σ
max
E
= 0.43), and (C): a QS system with
parameters that maximize cumulative fitness w for a public good with a
concave benefit function in both “turn on” and “turn off” scenarios,
(α = 1.4, KS = 2600, and σ
max
E
= 0.6). (A–C) Right side panels: Green
lines show 1gopt, the increase in growth rate achieved, as a function of
N when producing public good using the optimal production curve σ
opt
E
.
Full black line shows 1g as a function of N for the QS regulated
production curve marked “Turn on” in the plot to the right. Dashed black
line shows 1g as a function of N for the QS regulated production curve
marked “Turn off” in the plot to the left. The colored area underneath the
1g curves in the range N = [1,Nmax], (Nmax = 70) is proportional to the
cumulative fitness, w (defined in Equations 7 and 8).
situations and on the relative importance of these situations the
weight would be distributed differently. Since we do not have any
information about what exactly these weights are for any actual
ecological setting we will here, for the sake of argument, just
compare the two extreme cases of (θon = 1, θoff = 0) where
strictly “turn on” scenarios are important for fitness (possibly
an ecological setting like the case of Vibrio fischeri living in the
bobtailed squid where population dilution happens very fast) and
the case where “turn on” scenarios and “turn off” scenarios are
equally important for fitness (θon = 0.5, θoff = 0.5), (possibly an
ecological setting where the population relatively often faces the
risk of slow dilution due to the appearance of a cheater mutant).
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2.3.3. Fitness as a Function of the QS Feedback
Exponent, α
For a public good with a certain benefit/cost function pair there
will be a specific set of QS parameters, (α, KS, σ
max
E ), which
maximizes the fitness, w (def. in Equations 7 and 8). This is,
roughly speaking, the set of parameters that within the range
[1,Nmax] manage to best mimic the optimal production curve
(e.g., Figure 5A), or in the case where there is bistability and
both “turn on” and “turn off” curves are considered to be equally
important, it is the set of parameters which allows both curves to
best mimic the optimal curve at the same time, (e.g., Figure 5C) .
Often a single QS system will regulate the expression of many
different secreted products that can be very diverse in nature and
potentially have differently shaped benefit and cost functions.
Since the parameter KS quantifies the binding strength and
σmaxE the overall promoter strength of the promoter regulating a
specific gene product, it seems likely that these two parameters in
most cases can be fine tuned by evolution to suit the regulation
needs of individual QS products. The parameter α, on the
other hand, characterizes the way the QS signal molecule feeds
back on its own production and will thus in most cases be a
parameter which has to be the same for all the QS regulated
products, with the two exceptions that there can be more than
one QS system in the cell and that it is possible to have
different promoter sequences for signal synthase expression and
public good production. For example LasR can bind either
cooperatively or noncooperatively depending on the promoter
sequence, Schuster et al. (2004). In Figures 5A–C left panels,
the black lines show the QS regulated production curves where
the choice of parameters σmaxE , KS and α maximize cumulative
fitness, w, in three different situations. Interestingly, we see in
Figure 5 that the feedback exponent α which optimizes fitness
for a population regulating the “concave good” (h = 1) and
the “convex good” (h = 2) are quite different. For h = 1 the
optimal fitness of a QS production regulation curve is generally
found at lower values of α, where there is no bistability, (in
Figure 5A the optimal α value is around α ≈ 1). For h = 2
on the other hand, when fitness is optimized for “turn on” only,
fitness increases monotonically with increasing α, approaching
the maximal value of one, (note however that beyond α = 2
there is virtually no extra advantage to be had from increasing α
further, so in Figure 5B the QS curve plotted simply has α = 2).
At α values higher than αc ≈ 1.2 we are in the bistable regime
where the production curves will be different when going from
“low to high” and “high to low” cell numbers. When h = 2 and
fitness is optimized for both “turn on” and “turn off” the optimal
feedback exponent is at an intermediate value α ≈ 3/2. The
reason for this is that at low values of α the QS production curve
do not ramp up production fast enough while at higher values of
α, the system becomes highly bistable and “turn on” and “turn
off” curves thus very different which means they cannot both
resemble the optimal curve.
2.3.4. Regulating Expression of both Convex and
Concave Public Goods with one QS System
The α-values that optimize fitness for public goods with convex
and concave benefit functions (when cost is linear) are different.
It is thus interesting to think about what a bacteria population
which needs to regulate several different types of public good
with the same QS system would do. In general it is the case that
a broader range of α-values will result in QS production curves
with positive fitness for a concave good than for a convex, just as
we saw in Figure 3E that a range of different constant production
strategies resulted in w > 0 for the concave good, while all
constant production startegies gave w < 0 for the convex good.
This suggest that the evolutionary pressure which will drive the
system towards the optimal α value could be stronger in the case
of a convex good than for a concave good.
In Figures 5A–C left panels it is clear that for a concave
good and a convex good the topology of the 1g-“landscape”
is quite different. Recall that different sets of QS parameters,
(α, KS and σ
max
E ), correspond to different production curves:
From at Figure 5A it is apparent that for a concave good
there are several ways to “draw” suboptimal production curves
through the1g “landscape” without encountering regions where
1g ≪ 0, i.e., many choices of QS parameters which would
give a positive cumulative fitness w. For h > 1 on the other
hand we see that only curves which keep production relatively
low for low N and then ramp up production very rapidly
later can avoid passing through regions where 1g ≪ 0. This
means that for a convex good the range of QS parameters
α, KS and σ
max
E that result in positive fitness is relatively
narrow.
3. Discussion
3.1. Generalization to all Cases of Nonlinear Cost
and Benefit Function Pairs
For the sake of simplicity we have throughout this paper
considered the specific case of a linear cost function and two
slightly different sigmoidal benefit functions, one concave and
one convex (see Figure 1A). There is however no reason to
believe that actual public goods will have costs and benefits
which fit these arbitrarily chosen functions exactly. Fortunately
it turns out that more general cases of nonlinear cost and benefit
function pairs can be mapped onto the results presented. When
cost is linear, we saw that the convex and the concave sigmoidal
benefit functions fall into two major categories: Either they have
continuous or discontinuous optimal production curves. It turns
out that general pairs of (monotonically increasing) cost and
benefit functions all fall into either of these two classes. We
will refer to common goods with cost-benefit functions that
cause them to have continuous optimal production curves as
belonging to the “continuous class” and common goods with cost
and benefit functions which cause them to have discontinuous
optimal production curves as belonging to the “discontinuous
class.” If the benefit function b(NσE) and the cost function c(σE)
for a certain common good are known, it is possible to determine
whether the common good belong to the continuous or the
discontinuous class. If
b−1(y)
db
dσE
∣∣∣∣
0
> c−1(y)
dc
dσE
∣∣∣∣
0
(9)
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for all 0 < y, then the optimal production curve σ
opt
E (N) is a
continuous function.
While if there exists a value 0 < y∗ such that
b−1(y∗)
db
dσE
∣∣∣∣
0
< c−1(y∗)
dc
dσE
∣∣∣∣
0
(10)
then the optimal production curve σ
opt
E (N) has a discontinuity,
causing it to jump from zero to a non zero value at N =
Ncrit . See Supplementary Materials for the derivations of these
criteria. It must be emphasized that as we expect the shape
and magnitude of the cost and benefit functions to depend
sensitively on specific growth conditions, we thus predict that
the optimal production curves, and particularly the critical
population size where production needs to be ramped up, to
vary in different environmental conditions too. This prediction
fits well with the observation by Duan and Surette (2007) that
Las and Rhl expression profiles can vary greatly for different
growth conditions. Such environmentally sensitive responce
could for example be achieved by making QS parameters like
KS and σ
max
E , dependent on environmental cues such as nutrient
availability and stress factors recently dubbed “pull” factors in the
paper on core principles of QS systems by Hense and Schuster
(2015).
3.2. Discontinuous Class Public Goods Require
Density Dependent Regulation
Overall we can draw the conclusion that when Ncrit > 1 the
discontinuous class of public goods (which resemble the case of a
convex benefit curve and linear cost) require density dependent
regulation more so than the continuous class of public goods,
based on the properties of the optimal production curves. To
reiterate, these properties are for a discontinuous class good:
1. The optimal production curve has a discontinuous jump from
low to high production rate at Ncrit .
2. Even when N > Ncrit production at a rate lower than the
optimal one can cause a negative impact on fitness. (see
Figure 5).
The optimal production curve of a continuous class good on the
other hand have quite different properties:
1. It is possible to impact fitness negatively when N > Ncrit by
producing a continuous class good, but only by producing
at too high a rate compared to the optimum, never when
producing at a rate which is less than the optimum.
2. A group can indeed benefit from letting production of a
continuous class good depend of population size but deviating
from the optimal curve does not necessarily come at a great
fitness cost.
Because of the different properties of the optimal production
curves for continuous and discontinuous class goods the QS
parameters which would be needed to regulate them differ
too. In the case of a discontinuous class good, fitness can
be negatively impacted if the QS feedback exponent is not
appropriate. Conversely for a continuous class good, fitness can
be positive for a broad range of QS feedback exponents and
one could thus speculate that constant constitutive expression
could be a better choice for regulation of a continuous class
good than a potentially costly and elaborate QS regulation
mechanism.
Interestingly Schuster et al. (2004) find that LasR can bind
either cooperatively or non-cooperatively depending on the
promoter sequence. So although the overall signal feedback is
characterized by a single exponent αS, the individual public
goods, Ei, can have different responses to the signal-receptor
complex characterized by different exponents αEi (Schuster et al.,
2004). The reason for these differences could perhaps be that the
various secreted products have different cost/benefit functions
and thus different optimal production curves and consequently
different regulation needs.
3.3. QS Signal Feedback
Quorum sensing is a mechanism usually assumed to give
individual cells information about the density of the population.
It is thus paradoxical that one feature found in many quorum
sensing systems, the positive signal feedback, actually makes
a system less accurate for sensing population size changes.
Roughly speaking a strong positive signal feedback makes a
QS system more appropriate for answering the binary question
“are we many or few?” than for providing information about
the precise population size over a broad range of densities.
The reason usually given for why QS signals often feed back
positively on their own production, is that this feedback ensures a
synchronized response across a population (Hense and Schuster,
2015). Our analysis inspires another explanation for the existence
of positive QS signal feedback, which does not however exclude
the existing one. Recall that for a discontinuous class public good
the optimal production strategy calls for a sudden discontinuous
jump in production rate at a critical population size Ncrit . After
this critical population size has been reached a substantial growth
increase can be gained by producing public good at a specific
optimal rate, but there will exist a production rate lower than
the optimal one which will result in a growth rate decrease
(see Figures 5B,C, for N > Ncrit there exists a local fitness
minima below the optimal rate σminE < σ
opt
E ). When ramping
up production from zero to the optimal rate, the population thus
necessarily has to pass through a local fitness minimum. A reason
for having a strong positive signal feedback could thus be to
ensure a sharper turn on of the public good production in order
to minimize the time spent at the low production rates where
fitness is impacted negatively.
3.4. Potential Trade Offs
When only “turn on” scenarios are important for fitness it is
just the production curve that the population follows when
going from low to high numbers, which needs to mimic the
optimal curve, and bistability does not matter. If however both
“turn on” and “turn off” scenarios are important for fitness, this
changes. Now both the production curve which the population
follows going from low to high numbers and the curve it follows
from high to low numbers needs to mimic the optimal one
simultaneously. For higher values of the feedback exponent
this becomes problematic since the two curves will differ more
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and more due to the increasing width of the bistable range.
This suggests that a bacterial species which needs to accurately
regulate the production of a discontinuous class good both in
situations where the population increases and decreases, will face
an evolutionary trade off between “precision” and “sharpness” of
the production curves. Too high a feedback exponent will mean
imprecise turn on/off points for either (or both curves) due to the
bistability and too low a feedback will mean that the turn on/turn
off of the public good does not happen sharply enough. We
thus predict that a bacteria living in such an ecological settings
will have a feedback exponent bound at intermediate values—
relatively close to the point where the QS system starts to display
bistability.
3.5. Ideas for Experiments
With few exceptions (Melke et al., 2010; Sappington et al., 2011)
there is a general tendency in the QS literature to focus only
on the “turn on” of QS genes and only few studies have looked
thoroughly at the effect of positive signal feedback (in fact it is
disregarded in some theoretical studies, Brown and Johnstone,
2001; Nadell et al., 2008; Pai and You, 2009). To our knowledge
no one has attempted to assess the fitness cost of bistability
when both “turn on” and “turn off” scenarios are important.
Our analysis suggest thats it could be interesting to explore
experimental setups which examine how QS regulated genes are
turned off in response to a decrease in population density, and
setups which probe the effect of signal feedback on bistability. For
example our results suggest that two strains engineered to differ
in their QS feedback exponents would perform differently when
placed in the experimental setup of a turbidostat where controlled
slow fluctuations in density was set to occur right around the
point of QS turn-on and turn-off. A separate treatment could
involve major quick dilution and growth well past the turn-
on point. In the first case, both turn-on and turn-off would be
relevant, whereas in the second case, turn-on would be more
important.
3.5.1. Measuring the Shape of Public Good Cost and
Benefit Functions
The benefit function of a public good (e.g., elastase produced by
P. aeruginosa Pearson et al., 1997; Beaufort et al., 2013) could be
quantified by measuring the growth rates of signal-blind cheats
(e.g., the lasRrhlR mutant) in a chemostat, as a function of the
concentration of externally added public good (e.g., LasB, which
would act as a public good by facilitating the break down of the
main source of carbon which would be in the form of casein
peptide chains to large for transport across the cell membrane).
The cost function could be quantified by measuring the growth
rate of an inducible constitutive producer mutant at different
expression rates. It would be interesting to automate these types
of measurements so that they could be done for a wide range of
different molecules thought to be public goods, from different
bacterial species. The shape/convexity of the measured benefit
and cost functions could then be compared with already known
information about whether the molecules are QS regulated or
not, to determine whether discontinuous class public goods are
overrepresented among QS regulated compounds.
3.5.2. Manipulating the Shape of the Benefit Function
Experimentally
The way the specific public good LasB of P. aeruginosa works
might provide a way to manipulate the convexity of its benefit
function. When provided solely with a diet of casein polymers,
P. aeruginosa growth depends on the production of LasB (and
similar proteases) that degrade the casein polymers into smaller
importable units, which can be transported across the cell
membrane and metabolized (Efrat and Mary, 2014). In the
Supplementary Materials we show that the benefit function
becomes increasingly convex if the maximum length of the
polymers in the environment is increased. This suggests that
one way of experimentally manipulating the benefit function
would be to pre-digest casein polymers to varying degrees before
providing them to P. aeruginosa. Media with undigested casein
should result in a more convex benefit function than media with
pre-digested casein. Growth of constitutive producer mutants
could then be compared with growth of wild-type P. aeruginosa
in these media to test our predictions regarding the importance
of the convexity of the benefit function for QS regulation.
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